Abstract: We show that contrary to conventional wisdom intergenerational family transfers dominate scal policies as a remedy to the dynamic ineciency arising in a Diamond 
Dynamic eciency is a relevant issue to evaluate the eects of scal (debt) policies on economic growth. This analysis is usually developed in the overlapping generations settings of Diamond (1965) and Barro (1974) , both considering nitely lived agents. In Diamond (1965) people are pure life cyclers, dynamic ineciency can arise and then there is a case for scal policy such as public debt. In Barro (1974) agents are linked across generations by altruistic bequests. In such a setting public debt is neutral and the market equilibrium is dynamically ecient. However, Abel (1987) and Weil (1987) In this note, we show that the answer is positive as long as parents can shape the preferences of their children. Using the demonstration-eect approach popularized by there is dynamic ineciency. We can therefore interpreted them as automatic stabilizers, a role that is not performed by public debt policies, which worsen welfare under dynamic efciency. Second, when there are positive transfers, there exists a saddle path that converges to a steady state in which the capital stock can be made arbitrarily close to the Golden Rule one. 2 The economy.
Consider a perfectly competitive economy evolving over innite discrete time. A homogenous good is produced at each period t using two factors physical capital, K t , and labor, L t via 1 Nevertheless, their characterization of equilibrium rests on the assumption of existence, uniqueness and stability of the steady state of the Diamond (1965) economy (see Galor and Ryder, 1989 , for the necessary and sucient conditions). Relaxing these standard assumptions, Thibault (2000 Thibault ( , 2008 identies the full set of necessary and sucient conditions for obtaining the Barro's debt neutrality theorem. , where w t and R t are the wage and the interest factor, respectively, at time t and
Population is constant and consists of agents who live for two periods. Agents born in t supply a xed amount of labor, receive w t , consume c t and save s t when they are young. They earn and consume d t+1 when they are old. Preferences are represented by the logarithmic life-cycle utility function, U t = ln c t + ln d t+1 . At each t young agents are allowed to transfer a fraction x t ∈ [0, 1] of their income w t to their parents, so that 3 that the demonstration can be imperfect by assuming that with probability π a child simply imitates his parent's action, while with probability 1 − π he chooses an action to maximize his expected utility, anticipating that his own child may be an imitator.
Therefore agents born at t maximize πU (x t , x t , s t ) + (1 − π)U (x t , x t+1 , s t ) with respect to x t and s t .
The capital stock in period t + 1 is nanced by the savings of the generation born in t, i.e. k t+1 = s t . Two dierent dynamics of capital accumulation are thus possible depending on whether family transfers are positive or not.
2.1
Dynamics with no intergenerational family transfers.
Without family transfers (i.e. x t = x t+1 = 0), agents maximize U (0, 0, s t ) = ln[w t − s t ] + ln R t+1 s t with respect to s t . This coincides with the standard Diamond (1965) economy; using the rst order condition it is straightforward to see that s t = w t /2. Thus, the dynamics of capital accumulation are given by:
2.2
Dynamics with positive intergenerational family transfers.
When transfers are positive, the optimal pair (x t , s t ) must verify the two following rst order conditions:
3 The demonstration-eect approach can also be useful to study the issue of the long-term care nancing (see Canta and Pestieau, 2013) .
As π is time-invariant, the planning problem faced by each generation is the same as that faced by its predecessors so that (1) and (2) must be satised at each period.
Using this change of variable we have
After simplications, we obtain from (1):
Furthermore, using the fact that R t+1 /[R t+1 s t + x τ w t+1 ] = αX τ /k t+1 we obtain after simplications from (2):
The dynamics of X (and then of x t ), described by (4) are independent of k and, thus, straightforward. They are represented in Figure 1 .
The dynamics of X t and x t Characterizing these dynamics in terms of X (rather than in terms of x) allows us to work with an arithmetic-geometric sequence that has a unique stationary point: X = (1 + π)/(π − α). As 1/X t = α + (1 − α)x t , 0 < x < 1 if and only if 1 < X < 1/α.
Consequently, transfers are positive if and only if π > π = 2α/(1 − α).
The two dimensional dynamical system, denoted S, which describes the equilibrium paths in a neighborhood of the steady state (x , k ) with positive transfers is such that:
where the functions ψ and ϕ are respectively dened in (3) and (4),
We assume that there exist old generations of agents, born at time t = −1, whose behavior s −1 = k 0 is known at t = 0. Hence, S is a two dimensional dynamical system with one predetermined variables, k t and one forward variable x t . Our analysis allows for an explicit characterization of the saddle path. On this path we have x t+1 = x t = x and consequently the dynamics of optimal capital accumulation are 4 Let us precise the notion of saddle point that is usually employed in the optimal growth literature: a steady state (x , k ) of the two dimensional dynamical system S is a regular saddle point if and only if the dimension of the local stable manifold is equal to 1. The projection of the local stable manifold on the space (x t , k t ) is a local dieomorphism. Then for each initial values k 0 close to k , there exist a unique x 0 such that (x 0 , k 0 ) is on the stable manifold and the equilibrium path converges to the steady state.
given
3 Optimal capital accumulation and dynamic eciency.
Since the sign of π − π is time-independent, no switch is possible: family transfers are either positive or nil at all periods. We thus identify two regimes, characterized by the presence (or absence) of transfers x along the optimal capital path {k t } t≥0 :
Then, starting from k 0 > 0, the economy exhibits monotone convergence towards k = min k D , k . As ∂x /∂π > 0, it is important to note that family transfers depress optimal capital accumulation and, as long as π > π, k t+1 turns out to be decreasing in π.
As well known, dynamic ineciency occurs when capital is over-accumulated, i.e. when the capital stock is greater than the Golden Rule one k 4 Conclusion.
The main contribution of this note is to establish that intergenerational family transfers can be sucient to cure the dynamic ineciency arising in a standard Diamond (1965) economy.
Family transfers motives emanate here from the demonstration-eect: a child's propensity to make transfer can be conditioned by the parental example. In contrast to traditional remedies (such as public debt), the family transfers do not worsen capital accumulation and welfare under dynamic eciency. Then, g(x), which represents k t+1 − k t = 0, is a decreasing and convex function of x. The equation k t+1 = g(x) 1−α k α t can be rewritten as k t+1 − k t = [(g(x)/k t ) 1−α − 1]k t . Thus, below the curve k t+1 = k t , for any x ∈ (0, 1), k t converges towards g(x). Above the curve k t+1 − k t < 0, for any x ∈ (0, 1), k t converges towards g(x). Then, the steady-state (x , k )
is a regular saddle point and the dynamics in the neighborhood of (x , k ) are described in Figure 2 .
